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PROM SUPERM1NISTO SUPERCOMPUTERS:
ESTIMATLNO SURPLUS IN THE
COMPUTiNGMARKET
ABSTRACT
Innovation was rampant in the cnmputer indusny during the late 196CR and the 1970s,
Old innnvatinn vastly extend the capabihdes nf computers nr simply reduce the costs of doing
the same thing? This question goes to the heart of whether the rate of deehne in 'constant-
qualsty" cnmpnnng prices incorrectly identifies the sources of impnnvement and benefits from
tcchnnlng:cai change. This paper argues that innovation freed computers of technical constaints
to providing new senJees, nsamfesting many new eapabdities in systems with larger capacity.
Both anccdotai and qoantitative evidence suggest that many buyers adopted new systems to get
access to these new capabilities, not solely to take advantage of lower prices.
The analysis divides itself into several related questions. FUst, what innovations in this
pei-icd arc asmciatcd with extensions of capabilities? Second, 'do buyers adopt products that
embody extensions of capabilities? Thud, how does a nseasurement framework represent that
action? Are extensions embodied only in increases in capacity or are they embodied in other






innovation is rampant in adolescent industries. Oldproductsdie or evolve and new
products rcshace them. Each new gcncmtion of products offers new features, extends the
range of existing liratures, or lowers the cost of obtaining old fearures, Vendors imitate each
othcfs prcxlucts. so that what been a novelty becomes a standard feature in dii subsequent
generations. Depending on the competitive environment and the type of innovation, prices
may or may not reflect design changes.
The computer industry of the late i960s and l970s experienced remarkable growth
and ieeuning. At the start of the period several technological uncertainties defied easy
resolution. Must knowledgeable observer; could predict the direction of technical change, but
nut its rate Vendors marketed hundreds of new product desrgns throughout the 1970s, and a
traction of those products became commercially successful. in time the industry took on a
ceflainnntanty and predictability. By the late i970s, beth buyers and sellcun understood the
technical trajectory of the industry's products. Even the least experienced users understood the
capah;ilties and limits of the most popular commercial systems.
Tins paper attempts to measure the economic benefits that accrued to buyers from
technological innovation in the computer industry. Its thesis is that many innovations that
created economic ulue in this period are associated with extensions in computing
cupuhiiites. as distinguished front a decline in prices, which occurred at the same time as the
extensions, 'ibis paper does not argue that price decreases were uinmportant to buyers, but
that price decreases alone tell an incomplete story about the welfare miprovements realized by
buyers.I
Tel:thesis goes to the dear' of too relaLlonshlp cetween rapid conotant quality' price
dechner and the Jbrred im1 rnvcment in eernopnc welfare. The open issue concerns whethe,
conr:ant quality crioc irelices provide the same inTonation about the experience of a buyoc
who continnes to buy computer syr'"res with o sin-dior set of ehomacteristics, as "veil as a
hover cohn '1' es od:'aro.ge or the avahability of charatteristels that did not previously exlco
There are ro"sens at think corstar.t euthity price indices do no pro' ide the sane. infinsnaton
for both types of buyer:. The correspondence bcneen constant quality price indices and
economic 'eifare viE be weaker vale'. prodoct charocosristics crinno' be repackaged (og. see
Traherpe"; [199(1'). For e:eimnpie, one large cemputec system may provide more services to a
buyer than 'coo sy' e': xaoiy half thc omour :f measurable characteristics boo
appropriate ,velcare issue concerns buyer satisfaction with the extension of product space --
i.e.,extensions of the range of quality available. If a set of adopters of new products could be
accurately survesed, how much would they be willing to pay not to give up the new
oaoahbity associatod both extensions of cornput's's'? A large body of work on cost of living"
indices suggests that the "viilingiess to pay" for product extensions may have a nonlinear
relationship to constant quality price decreases)
The problem considered here does not lend itself to a single statistical test or
experiment. To reach a onvincmg conclusion, it would be better to see tf a variety of
it is well known that prOc indices have problems measuring the benefits associated with new goods. The
scene problem arises if 'entonsions of product space (e.g., inventing s system with computer capacity twice as
high as sn pre'ieus system) crc associated with new sercices, L's either event there is an important issue
regarding the procedures for inoonasrating new goods into price indices. As Triplett [19119] argues the central
issue in dcvcloptng appropriate procedures revolve srocnd the goals of the indero whether ii intends to retire'
charges Ic the costs of prrdtscicg' or dirges in the "coo of i'zingd Th:s paper focuses primarily on issues
regarding the mesaorement cf chngcs scorning to buyers.3
information sources points in a similar direction. This paper addresses itself to several related
questions. First, what innovations in this period are associated with extensions of capabilities?
Second, do buyersadoptproducts that embody extensions of capabilities? Third, how coold a
measurement framework reoresent that action? Are extensions embodied only in increases in
capacity or other measurable features of a compoter system?
Many of these questions reqoire an explicit supply and demand framework. The
difficult issoe concerns the flt of a framework to a differentiated product industry; inevitably,
some features of reality are saerifiecd to a model. This paper modifies a Bresnahan-Beny
model of vertical quality differentiation, which differentiates products along only one
dimension, here, computing power? While simple, this specification captures much of the
difference in demand thr systems with different computing capacity, i.e., measurable changes
in demand liar systems with higher speed and more memory. The paper argues that changes in
capacity provide inlbrmation about the introduction of new capabilities and services. Thus,
the model quantifies an important extension in product space over time and the contribution
to surplas lions these extensions. In addition, the model estimates the decline in the cost
Sanction of computer vendors over time, which serves a secondary goal, namely to estimate a
frilly specified model of the computing market in which changes to the costs of producing
quality alters market outcomes. Finally, though the model predicts inter-system competitive
outcomes with only limited success, it provides a rough measure of the importance of new
2Allprevious research investigates automobile producer and buyer behavior (Bresnahan [1981], [t987b],
Fcemtra and Levinsoha [1989], Berry, Levinaohn and Pakes [1993]). Previous use of these methods required a
complete census on the price, quantity and characteristics of every product in the market. The methods developed
here can be used w5en a complete census of product characteristics is not known, which suits data typically
available so a computer industry researcher.product entry forbuyersurplus.
This section brief3y describes important features of technological change in the
mauttramc computing market from 1968 to 1981. This period witnessed a rapid decline in
prices, a dramatic extension of capabilities. and a notable change in the quality of alternatives
to mainframes. For some buyers the economic benefit associated with technological change to
mainframes was associated with declines in prices, for others it was extensions of capabilities.
Each is discussed in turn.
Over the long nan, usainfratne products underwent rapid decline in prices per
measurable unit of computing, usually measured by CPU speed and memory capacity. The
important open debate concems the association of dramatic change in price per computing
unit with the introduction of particular products and other market events.3 For example,
there is no agreement about the improvement over previous generations associated vrith the
introduction of the IBM system 370. This disagreement is important for any calculation of
economic welfare because the system 370 replaced the system 360, and each was the most
popular system in the United States in its day. Second, and more generally, the prices of old
and new generations of systems, which may be substitutes, do not follow a simple pattern.
Corstniction of constant quaitty price indices has received mach attention because of its importance for
(IMP measurement There is much disagreement about the proper nsetheds to use and the proper data to employ
to measurc this phenomenon. See Gordon [1989], [1990], Duiberger [1989], Cole et al [1986], Tripiett [1986,
1989], Bemdt and Gritiches [t990], Bemdt, Showaher. and Woolridge [1991], and Oliner [1992]. Related
research on the welfare benetiu from technical change uses ain3slar price indices to recover surplus generated
from declines in the price of aggregate competing capital. Sometimes this approach also requires niessuremeot of
'siilingness to pay for new capabilities, which is often oifticulr to obtain (e.g., see Bresnaban P986]. Flarnns
[19871. Scads and Morrison [i992], Oryaolfsson [1993]).Some observers argue thatdisequilibriuminfluenced the pricing of mainframes, thous
there is much disagreement about its root causes (Fisher et ad [1983], Dulberger [1989],
Gordon [1989]). This debate influences the interpretation of the technical improvements
embodied in new and old vintages. Both issues are discussed below.
This industry also experienced extensions in capabilities in many dimensions. Some
improvements are reflected in the easily measurable features of a system, particularly those
extensions associatcd with increases in computing capacity. Larger computing niemogr and
faster CPU speeds permitted users to address increasingly more complex problems and
regularly pcrthnn tasks that could not be previously accomplished, let alone attempted.
Scientific and engineering users were the first to take advantage of faster computing speeds
and larger memories. Internal and extemal storage capacity also expanded, and input/output
speeds increased. Ihese innovations mac large databa cs easier to use and broadened their
potential applicability. Hardware architecture and operating system software underwent many
refinements associated both multi-user systems, a development crucial to all timesharing
applications and applications that require many users to perform quick queries of centralized
databases. Service bureaus, insurance and banking users, and many large organizations
employed these developments in new inventory and reservation systems. Later refinements
required qtnek access to large databases in real-time. These applications diffused widely in
the l9tibs and the refinements began diffusing in the mid 1970s (Fisher, McGowan, and
McKie [1983], Flamm [1989]).
Other extensions were also very important, but are not so easily assoeiated with
measurable features of a processor. Solid-state circuitry, improved air-conditioning units, andmore OutrotO' dosgn aiso made systems morereliableand lowered serv:cing costs, which
resulted it' die exoarsi.m of computing into ever more essential enterprise functions New and
buttes pmgmrnmuog hngrtanes ai' diffused across many systems. By the end of the t97Us a
third.parr' software indusoy tar' begun to mushroom, further diffusing refrna'd application
cotiware across many computing platforms Other peripherals also in roved and became
embodied it printers, terniinals, and countless other minor components. The relevant point is
dint these rnesvatiora and many others were important to buyers. but arc not easy to measure.
As die comgrter industry man"ed, users came to expect change —i.e.,extensions of
capabilities or entirely new products —.andplan far change. Buyers modified the memory and
peed of then CPU. hut here other dumbba investments in software or peripherals. Or, buyers
unhia teed particular software programs or peripheral components. but not other parts of their
systems. As buyers learned about their needs and discovered technological opportunities, as
new products were introduced, and as old products became obsolete, buyers had to
nrhaoaii, reevaluate their situations. A regular cycle uegan o emerge: penphernl and
sofavore upgrading induced bottlenecks in CPUs, vrtdoi' induced further CPU upgrading.
ssi'dch induced further peripheral and software enhancements, The introduction of timesharing
and techniques for querying central databases further accelerated these regular cycles.
Three important points follosv from this cycle: first, upgrading to larger CPU capacity
became associated with talcmg advantage of technical improvements in other parts of the
system. Thus the invention of and reduction in the price of; large computing capacity
enabled many users to tales advantage of technical change in complementary components.
For many buyers. demand for greater computing capacity reflected demand for7
complementary peripherals and software. Second, the extension of capabilities in peripheral
componeots, software, and CPUs interacted with enhancements in other parts of the system.
The economic value created by' the extension of computing capacity, while obviously
imoortant, does not relate in any linear fashion to the decline in prices in constant quality
CPUs. Value creation must also relate to the prices and functions in other parts of the
system.
Third. therate ofvalue creation to a buyer could be much different than the rate of
price declineincomputingcapacity.Itmaybe faster if declines in prices enabled a user to
reahzelocal economiesofscale inthe distribution of computing services and employment of
computing capital investments. Localized economies could produce the repackaging problem
in CPU product characteristics, i.e., buyers value the increase in computing capacity
embodied in CPtJz Since researchers of centralized management of computing facilities (e.g.,
Inmon [l9hhi, Priedman and ConVord [1992]) emphasize the renlacement cycle, this factor
was probably very important for many buyem. On the other hand, the tme of value creation
to a buyer could be slower if the bottlenecks underlying the replacement cycle choked off the
ability to realize much advance. Since researchers of centralized management of computing
the ilities also emphasize increasing buyer dissatisfaction with translating enteeprise needs into
feasible teelmical solutions, particularly by the early l9SOs, then many buyers may not have
realize localized economies of scale.
Notable changes to non-mainframes partially determined the relative value buyers
placed on the changes to large systems. If some buyers do not have a repackaging problem,
declines in prices may simply induce purchases of cheaper computing power, but not8
necessariivpurchases of a bigger CPU. That is, the choice between a large or a small CPU
deoends on tho relative price!ner characteristic for small and large systems, as each is
introduced. This is imoortant because there were marsy changes in these ohoices over the
period. Pew general-purpose computing suhstiootes for mainfianoes were available in 1968, but
over the i970s minicomputer hardware along with general-purpose software was developed,
so that users could periorrn some small tasks that previously required mainfarnes, These
mirdcompnters wore especially attractive tie a decentralized computing environment. By l98i
minicomputer vendors were also beginrdng to offer users viable growth paths for their
systems if the users needs ourpeew large superrninis.4 In principle, buyers could (and many
did) break up their computing needs into smaller units, taking advantage of decentralized
management. Most importantly for empirical purposes, the costs and capabilities of smaller
systems shift over the period, and their purchase is outside the view provided by the data in
this paper.
This brief history suggests that it may not make sense to conceive of technological
change as equivalent to a simple fall in the price level. Price declines enabled many events
that took place. Yet, important episodes of value creation were associated with specific
inventions that extended buyer capabilities into new areas --e.g.,the invention of reliable
real-time database query, the invention of multi-user computing without intenuption. Value
creation was not associated solely (or even primarily) with the decline in costs of the delivery
of these services. The willingness to take advantage of new capabilities in any period became
associated with a willingness to adopt computing capacity of higher and higher levels. The
'Note rEar personal computers were only begimiog to difitise by t981 and were largely employed as
sophisticated rsrminals. PCa were not viewed as substitutes for mainframes except for very avail probiems.9
irnponanee of theY \Vii1s to pay for new capabilities will ultimately be an empirical
issue. Is there evidence of much adoption of systems with increases in capabilities?
llLBicabbki
A soppl, -side model and a demand-side model compnse this papeds measurement
framczork. itic model theuses attention on the demand for computing capacity. The model is
dexible enough to allow underlying demand preferences to vary over different capacities and
sizes and to change over time. It also pennits the costs of supplying computing caoaeity to
decline ovcr time. Finally, it provides a rough test ofether vendors compete solely in
measu1 able features of computing capacity.
r'wjd-stonsaderfl
Consider a market in a given year As in Bresnahan's (1981], [1987a] model of the
automobile market, this study makes five assumptions: (1) All users evaluate all mainframe
computers in terms of the same (vertical) index of quality, i.e., computing power. (2)Users
diflbr in their vvillingness to pay for computing power. (3) There are many "uses" for
computer systems. each reqniring one computer system. (4) Eaeh potential user compares
among N possible diflbrent models. The net benefit from each model jinuse i is U =e4
I I lere, e is the marginal utility of quality, which varies across users i, d is quality, and pis
price of the pro'dLiet (5) There is a composite good of "lower" quality, which is not partof
the focus product group, hut is a potential option for purchase by users. This will be good
zero, the "outside good' It sells for price P5andhas quality da. In this study, the outside
good is equivalent to a small IBM mainframe or a general-purpose superminieomputer. Its10
price and quality change each year.
Equilibrium in the market concems the demand forcomputingpower. The system
choseosatisfiesU;: > U15 forall],k Thus,an optimal choiceimpliesthat st > h15 =(P-
P5ghl-ct3forall],ki. Ioequilibrium,userswillfmd that they can rank systems (see
Breanahan [1981] forelaboration)according totheircompoting power, All] models are
ranked according todorlii;either is equivalent in equilibrium.5 Some systems will provide
considerable computer cower but will be ercoensive, while others will pnovide little computing
pover but will be inexpensive. The data in this study appear consistent with this slructural
assumption fortworeasons:(I)A spread exists between the capabilities (and prices) ofthe
least and most powenlid mainframe, and(2) roost measuresofcomputingperformance and
prices are highly cotreiated.
Let the willingness topayforcomputingpower, e1, be distributed according to some
thnction F(z). Thds function represents the cumulative distribution of purchasers with a
marginal utility of purchase less than z. Let S, measure the market share ofproduct].Model]
=Nis the highest quality available and b1 measures a choice between] andj-1. This implies
=F°(I-
[BkalSj),j =l,...N,whem S =Q/M Q1isthe qua tity sold for product i, and M
is thetotal potentialsize of the number ofuses,If M is a parameter to be estimated and Qis
data, then by design 0 <Z' S I, so M> )J'Q1, since the outside good is not observed.
Thatis, estimates of tat, the total size of the market, must exceed the total number of
In this model >dimplies P >P0 forall obaen'edj ayatems, ainee a ayatem violating this inequality
would not tu chosen at all. Thus, phces must dat faster than quality as quality improves. Increasing the marginal
costs of qualiry can yield this outcome. Soc Bresnahan [1981, 1981] and Beny [1992] for farther elaBoration.Sarr"wd parehcosH, to Bresietan [1981], [1987a], this paper also employs a uniform
tastri Than.bI -[Y"Sj. Thus, estimating the density is essentially the same as
oNtuaato'g M ftctliuarrateu in ftftre 1. The above implies a retationsnip betsseen
t:urkccneatncl:e7tte lcd d. (P-Rplj lN. toadapttoanineemplete
days et 1expoincd bcloss), take ae definition fur h anu substitute rcarsively to get d -tic—
1,lIP_-P )il -da'1,.S14.
outart Figuar I appruxima_eiy ler
ftc mode! cuts several notevvorth: features fast, equisaicot prices between model]
I eaph uyiva1ent qualities. Second the value ofT -d5is the net quality of a system
cot iperco sstth 'inaide good. Without a measure of the quaIl'3 'f the outside good. it is
.5 I".e H t.f.ueJ3 .nputc an md' x ol a 'y. teoft 'aal9o ..omporecl with an
'u,s,i .t.ecly.'J ,.e" ,H intstookeathreare!o! oserpretotac beeausethepneeandquality
'a e'c't. cIa oos.i we enartflbog over time. Third, eon'putbsg e -ddoes not ruqune any
-SC., Loetertsties, oniy data on prtees and quantities. It I,, entirely a fi.inetion ef
trsat'd ysH,ted coats and the data about the prd and market shares. This will suit
-.cilabledata eel csliere there is acceptable infbruation o', prices and quantities, but not on
cc cry sy stem's characteristics.
IL Stpe[ at fin eons ilT sti
Ore', uus authors ',aseSc5LThtXititus NI suns knosun, so es'urnating Ni is one novelty here (Beny [l992jj.
Berry 119921 saqgees eatogdisthbotioncother thanthe unifann.With an exponentialdistributionwe getb
= - tflo(s.c'exp'-b.O) -t9ntni', S) whereEiis the mean of theexponential distribution.This must be set
to ,sinceIt is a t aIrrro'ed.Pre.iosinary research also used an exponential distribution and found no change in
the essernai welts,this paper ecu only show results for the miform distribution, For the pnee and quantity
data used ii thi, papen estimates of 2r.plied quality with the two distributions were highly correlated in every
year of't.a sri4'iO (e'oood .9).There are man' opl:ooal faxns for describing supplyside behavior, The simplest is
the care of independent pnicb;p This modei assumes that the economic actor who prices a
5' toe: cni -ne:Oeto lie ffLct if a rostem's onoe on iso rrr ntaauity f that system and
foes nor mtema,tze the eftect oft' at systeods pace on tho prc'5tan isp; of any other system.
eduginal c unuc u 'n lifi5f P; S/{([i(Th S1j]/thJt ;+{ii2t S'i]!(Fgi -fti)l sere
'i'us xorescni raker :3'artageof 'lie reftion of b in tot us of prtces and implied
quasi'i toY
TIe i.;deyotxIcn 'rithn; model e-asii" generalIzes Se a rrnlectu,n! ''ariatiuns n'odft
Ti-e'oai'san iIY9'. an ap::o.arI; "ldelv used in 'esipirscai applications for testmg bohaviora'
ansptior..s." Thu cc:)of variation parameter tests the rssun.ptlon of Bertrand pricing
vzlili n to roucbiy equivalent totestingwhether some unobserved factor other than demand for
compu' big capacity influences prices. Marrinal revenue is MR =f-
exp(S)Q1stAj(d-
-
cgi"].iris easier to estimate eaqs(6I than v liecacse it p"events accidental division by
in a maximum likelihood aigodshns. Testing flcrtran bed avior amounts to 1estmg H:8 =
Pargo, ftc: is Joce toiand Bertrand pricing ; rolected The demand elasticity far
system-' jis=
-Pg(P,Q.MgiexpgigigiNotice that M anh eXp/P) are the only estimated
;'aramneters in MR and &,whichmeans many factors influence the estimate of M. '[his is
important becaase the bounds on the estimate of ha M> Z1Qlimitsthe elasticity. Since
exp(tf) acts in mvecserelationto tot estimates off may offset limits associated with
8Notethatnaralnalmevunurrnstbensftslslyadlusted'MsenP=,vdmichisarareesentinthisdata This
paper adopts the c'snventior ,ha bnm' systems sompete against their nearest neighbors. Thus, the marginal bar aPt
from chaneiog a pboe is from caning into that nemghbo?a market abuse.
See the disarasico in Bres'sahar :trsodTirole t1989] fcr more on this paint.13
estimaung 1st
This modei of vendor behavior has several obvious dratdoaeks. Independent pricing
violates the spirit of multi-product competition in the mainframe computer industry.t5
Morcoser, the above specification is not ideal for modelling the pricing of older systems,
wheretheused market constrains pricing (Oliner [1993]). Finally, the above specifications do
not treat vendors asyuanetncally, which vtolates industry folklore about IBM s dominance.
issue arc mponant issues for the estimation of vendor behavior, though not necessarily
important far the estimation of buyer surplus, nor necessarily for quantijing extensions in
product space. The discussion of results will ingidight when these issues pertain to this study's
analysis.
lMjththntiua
ilerry 1:19911 compares the computed implied quality with measured quality and the
implied tnart nal revenue with measured marginal cost, which is the strategy used here, with
modtieatons to match available data. The measures of quality are the vector x1 for product j.
Thend, -tIL-'explstl1- tao and MR1 =exp(sy+us), where ad5 andes1 are error terms.
The multiplicative Ibnn air the quality index is for convenience. The multiplicative form for
margnal cost, loilovsing previous research (e.g., Bresnahan [1981], [l987a]), assumes that
marainal costs are convex in characteristics. It also guarantees positive estimated marginal
costs. it is necessary to instrument for x5 since the cost of desiguing systems with x
characteristics detemsines the observed ehanieteristies and their prices (and quantities and
'°Thisexperiment e'nnot employ Bresnahsos [19811 approach to this issue because in this pspe?s data it is
very mconu000 toe the some hon tu market two 'neighboring" products.14
implied qualitY. ieaoino te ri nuierneous eouaticns hats,
Note that d. is en imp teit function of M end P This analysis assumes M is unkncnr
and ft is hooves 'vith uce exceqrYn described below," Let M= T(Xi—rrj valece TQ
e,,Q is the tots' number of observed purchases. This analysis assumes n =rfrr oh t. hut
otherwise there wil, be c operate ruppIy and demand eouation,s for each year n the inittal
estimates)2 As described reeiov, the data arc arrsngcd 'atdetermineP. in coon eor. This
benefits the sm datiurn later and does not significantly change estimation results
Wreo M end the other pyrometers are not Leo' -at, theyeon be ectresated atmg
,,ur' meor thrrc-°tsgo ioa°t rquores tAmemsya ti985 Mintmote fS,ry®P1 e, vhere
o Y -fxP2xr'YP:ftho P. —Z[7ZZ.and e ='e4,ss).N =IS,tviR). d and MR are
vectors of the left-hand side variables, x is the matrix of regressors, X is a block diagonal
matrix of regressors x, z is a matrix of the set of instruments for x, end Zisa block diagonal
matrix of instruments z The choice of x and z will be discussed below, Note, however, that
this s"stem con be estimated sinoe there exists a complete set of data on prices and quantities.
ihere ie no need fer 's veriobies for every system's characteristics. a is a 2x2 matrix of
consistent estimates for the variance and eovariance of & These estimates are found from the
nonlinear two-stage least squares errors and are equal to a =ft(de)T, where T is the
If M is known. then it i easy to estimate the independent pricing model. ft can be left unidentified
within a constant term. Thus. ore cm estimate hof --= ecland hftMR) -x4cc=erming a standard
mmimum—distance estimator.
Other parameterizadons of the size of die market did not produce qualitatively different results so this
paper only presenrs the sbnp'ect soeo,ttcat,on.
'2Withoutfurther OL.norni-.r -.oohir,g of the outside good and its quality, d3, the structural form for P will
necessarily he sd bce. idresrai,sn 98:. :987] deals with this issue by positing a hedonic relationship hetaseen
the qualiri of the 'utatte aped sr,o 's price.15
number of observations. Minimizing the above yields estimates for C4and M whieb then
yields estimates of dd5 and elasticities)4
There is a subtle tradeoff between guaranteeingpositiveestimates of marginal costs
and g'aaranteerng plausible elasticity estimates for every product. If marginal costs are positive
by design, nvsreinai revenue may be negative for a few observations 'shere parameters
estimates are 'fbi away" from their respective optimums. This is problematic because it
destroys any maximum likelihood algorithm (be., ln(NR) does not exist for MR < 0). The
more general point is that the functional form cannot guarantee that all product elasticities are
less than negative one at non-optimized parameters. This is related, since MR5 =[P5(l±I/e)].
The approximation in[P1(l±l/e))ln(11) + I/c1 eliminates both problems and results in
positive marginal costs everywhere. This works well with this paper's data because 1/ is
much less than -1 tbr all but a few observations in the fmal estimates. The alternative solution
to the above problems, which is not presented, is to not guarantee that marginal costs are
positive. This alternative lets elasticities attain both plausible and implausible values without
stopping the whole estimation, but it sometimes results in negative predicted marginal costs.
Since a Sew implausible elasticities are inevitable under either specification, at least the
approximation above guarantees positive marginal costs. As it turned out, all but a few
elasticities stere much smaller than -l ar optimized parameters, so the cost of using the
In practice, minimizing f can in very mime consuming. Effort is saved by meempsizing that the optimized
estimated (Send a wit in let(S)' =[X5c®P/Xf'[X(a®P3Yf Seeing land a equal to optimized values
and substituting into f yields a concentrated function determined solely by the value of M and market power
parameters. It is then straightforward to find the optimal a and 3 (as fitnetions of the optimal d and wilt). The
fmal step is tn find the sunderd ermes for all the estimates by computing the varianee-eovariancc matnx with all
the (already optimized) parameters.16
approxm.ation was small.'
Thetotal buyeT surpius netofoutside good = ([bt±b3+][d4]/2-[V-Ps])Q;.
Since d5 is not identified. di alone cannot be identified, The did0can canoe from two
possible sonrces. If there is characteristic data for all systems, then it is possible to use the
estimate of 3 and X. Since this paper does not have data for all di,'sten-ts, c -d0come directly
from the estimate of M and the data on prices and qoantities.
This method does not measure the benefits from buying a system in terms of its
characteristics. Nor does it measure the average benefits from buying a system, or the total
benefits, to buyers from computerizatiofi. There are two reasons for this, First, this model of
each yeats competition presumes to measure the benefits associated with the last hit of
computing power purchased, not the surplus associated with buying the first fractional unit of
computer power. Second, the method does not anchor the estimates of the quality of a system
over time. mat is, the absolute level of quality of a particular model is not constrained to be
similar over time. Thus, surplus estimates may change over time due to changing units of
comparison. In particular, the outside good changes each year, altering the relative benefits of
being in the mainframe market.
These limitations make the method well suited to two unit-free estimates of the
One other aitersative is to use an error structure like the one found in Bresnahan [1981,1987]. He solves
for the optinosi price sod quantity under the sssurnption that the mcdel is correct and compares those computed
numbers against the actual observed data. Breanaharts alternative requires a complete data act, i.e., characteristics
for all models. Whiie this exists for new automobiles, such data do not exist for the historical computer market,
rendering this sltenative infeasible.17
importance of new enuy. One is to estimate the percentage of surplus in a given year
attributable to systems with certain features, such as young age or large computing power.
The main advantaoe of thrs measure is that the percentage of surplus is unit-free and easily
compared over time. If extension of capabilities matters in this market, then it must at least
hoid io the single capability extended here, computing power. If the percentage of surplus
associated with large systems falls over time, then we reject the view that this factor matters.
A second experiment involves removing systems sssth particular characteristics and
comparing surplus generated with and without those systenn. This comparison is in the spirit
of sselfare calculations that hold population and demand characteristics constant, but change
the choice set available to consumers- As before, the percentage difference in surplus is unit-
free and easily compared over time. If buyers adopt new systems because they embody
'anohservahla hut valuable, extensions of capabilities, then removing new systems could result
O large losses in surplus.
YUnhI
Thispapef s data on computer prices, quantities, and vintages comes from mdusfly
censuses from Intemational Data Corporation's (DC) EDP Industry Reports (EDPdR)is. IDC
estimated the number of installations of each type of computer system and, until 1981,
Patrick McGovern begat compiling this census in 1962 in Computers and Automatlon magazine. It
continued in meddled form under tUC auspices from the mid 19bPs onward. The archivea of the Charles
Babbsae insmiuao at the University of Mianesota contains a collection. This paper also makes use of a set of
PUP toduosv Reouos contained at the Library for the Graduate School of Business at Stanford University.18
estimatedthemonthly recta et woieh an aven'ge type ofsystem leased)5The datain this
paperbegins bethriteDecember 511968 reportanal endswiththeJanuasy1,1981 report
The lest year ho 'olden °EC dhrirpeishro beoo'een the camber rfjosfiflatjons inoide an'
outside the United States as 1968 beer the entire fturteen year period, this data concerns
late installed case at "var 359 ditierent computer sytsems (see appendix of Greenstein
)i994]j This 's elearty the beer data available ott tim size of installed base and rental prices.0
VL1,Jlitatitmpk
'fiim ut n, dlfl cdt n°n biases arIse from mcinrainin5 exelusise use ufiDCs
drfn)ioc of a meln.femt'. First 'be 1°f8 and. toad debidtir" ofa mainleame is too broad, It
Includes some systems rIco DeC reclassified as 'Digital DedIcated Application in 197o.
TEen. systems are actually minicomputers like the DEC PDP-8, not genemI-purpose systems.
Second, more redefinition problems arise on a smaller scale once IDC establishes several on
poing dnsannsss for systems ether than mainframes (1 e., minicomputers, small business
rstems, desktop). be roscar'b vs .'eeaslvnah" move a ryatem into the mainframe category
that was not previously there. Its rasearehers nlsn move a system out of the mainframe
Phister identifies several years in which tt)C revised the reported nomber of installaliorLa in previous years,
osnicuisr for taM models in i967-t97. In those cases, Phisseds repcned uçKlstca were used. This makes mis
papods esttmavs ecmpsrable aim Phisteis [1979] sod Flanmis [1987a,b] description of the difitasion of
compu:irg eoesvrent, sthijs osed more aggregate IliaC dais. II also nsskes this paperti results comparable to
OItnefs 11992] 'oziysti dada' retirement patterns smong IBM mainframes, vhirh uses similar hOC data for IBIS
systems.
IOu 'otter ."orp'obv dies seems exists for this perIod. Remarkably, only a few studiss of the eoorf,s'g
market (e.g Mtcoceis '979], Pfizer [1979], fissnm t1987a,bI, Duiberger [1989]. Ohner [1992], Khsm'io
[1994]l have used pests of thIs data and none have ever expletted all facets of it (e.g., see Irireenstein [1094'f'
an cxnmination of diffusion119
category that previously was there.
The best solution to this problem defmes the outside good consistently across different
yeses of the sample. This pope? s outside good is the smallest mainframe offered by IBM a
system 360/20(introducedin September 1965). The system 360/20 has the virtue that it is
very close to the smallest mainframe in llIX2s census, but it provides a more consistent
definition of the lower hound on this market over time than that used by IDC. Moreover, its
price changes throughout the sample period, reflecting real changes in the quality and market
price of systems peribmaing small decentralized computing tasks. Finally, it eliminates only a
few useful potential observations in each year.2° Table 1 shows the results of this selection.
Consistently defining the outside good does not impose a large loss. The systems used by
more than 20,01)0 buyers typically are sampled. The ttreatest losses occur in the most recent
years, when this procedure elinamies 12 of the 178 potential observations from IDC's census.
[Table 1 approximately here]
liver with a eonststently defmed outside good, two potential problems remain. First.
ICC oevised its survey scope twice, once between 1969 and 1970, and once between 1976 and
1977, In both eases, IDC consolidated the number of models it covered,21 Second, by the end
of the sample, the difference between mainframes and some large general-purpose
'Theroostimportant ease is IDX7s decision to includethe tBM System36 in the sample in 1976 (estimated
installed base at 5000 units) and exclude it from mainframes after that (bat include it in "small business
systems") Fairly experiments shossed that this particular flip.flop makes 1976's estimates inconsistent with other
years.
ss Pars of the reason is that there is iess characteristic data available for the small systems.In addition, the
vastnojori'.y at eliminated systems were commercial failures.
For example, the number of models covered in 1969 was 176, while only 147 were covered in 1970, In
1976 there were 305 medels covered, but only 188 in1977.SeeTableI.20
msmcomputer lawia. 'super'ssmS) bee. mes blurred. vthich raises questions about tile
survey's eosnp'ete'sees. The main issue is whether ODd ineluded in the mainframe eategory au
the supereshinleummtrr systems that ve"e dose substitutes for generakpurpose matnframes. si
reasonable ease outhit be made that ODd included most reles sot systems? but a reasonable
-ease could also be mode thea t did not? Ending the sample in 1981 holds this problem to a
mmrrnum.
epsueruseTthetnetalledbascofsystetrsu:2 pe-enyearasameas"'eotauanrity
uart et stare This isjus1ifien bec.stse nor' -': noteased their eouipment in the late
i°°5's .nd wi0s Mono.many mainframe compoters are not subject to frequent
•eclue'dLnt breakdosw'.s, so the services delivered do not physically depreciate rapidly after
sale. If at oil thaugb tts market value may depreetate due to teehnoIoeal obsolescence). Tins
dosssbaei.He that this defInition overstates the poptdarity of m old system (md the general
hi -e sass of the market) by showing that old and new systems are in competition.
While ?b1ister [19791 clearly believes that ildUs estimates of installed base are the best
°ttis not clear whether the money spent on euperminie ever amounted to more tisan a small fraction of the
amount of mcney spent on mainframes. According to the 1983 l]ttC census for minicomputers and mainframes,
the value of tnstshed base sssariated with super-nsinicomputcrs came to roughly half the value of all
rsiricomputers, or rougy 15 percent of the value of the installed base of mainframes. IDOs census differs from
the other censuses, psrticulsriy CBEMA's, because IDC includes se',ersi systems as mainframes (i.e., those from
IBM) which others classifr as super-nsinicomputers. This makes fIrs census more "complete," which matters
by the early t980s. Fsr exsmple. ac'nrding to the CBEMA [1992], in l976 insinfranse shipments reached over 5
billion dollars, whiie the toed spent on all rnissicomputers was 1.8 billion, By 1982, CBEMA estimstes that
msinfr'sme shipments reached iO oiiior and mihicomputer shipments reached 7.7 billion. CBEMA Seas not
stare 'aloe fraction 'cent to super miri'omputers. but 7,7 billion clearly osen'tstes the size of the rompethicr
between m,si'sfrsme sod mtsiccosp'teiu.
The most questionable omissions in thiCs msin.frsnse tables are those regarding the VAX models frnm
DEC, end chrrilar competitive models from other floss such as Wsng. Prime, sad Dais General.21
among the available alternatives, he nevertheless warns about several potential problems that
could influence calculations using these data25 Dulberger also questions the accuracy of IDC's
estimates of installed base, while conceding that they arc the best publicly available!5 Given
these concerns, the data was tested for internal consistency, which it readily met.25 in any
event, no alternative is satisfactory. Sales data is not available, and it is not possible to
estintate suies horn the change in installed base from year to year, because it becomes an
increasingly poor estimate of shipments of systems when systems become more than a few
years old.
lix: estimated the price of a typical system configuration, which is the price used in
this study. lUG's estinsates arc probably the right order of magnitude, but are also subject to
rneasurement error- l'hister uses these prices for estimates of the value of installed base.
HowevT lie believes that the prices for obsolete systems are too high, since IDC would use
the lest ulibred price hiir a system lacking any recent transaction, but that the bias in old
prices influences only a few of the systems in the United States. Flarnrn reaches a similar
conclusion befure using Phistefs estimates for a few calculations? Thus, no strong
°tieoases on pa. 250. "Ii is my opinion that 1to2s staff; files, and data sources make that organization's
published statisncs the test avai!abie." Yet, due to occasional revisions of previous EDP/IR reports, Phister is not
convinced that IDC's estimates of the size of installed base are precise. However, many of his uses of this data
reveal his hsthef that IDC got the general order of magnitude correct. Where available, this paper uses Phiste?s
correetons.
°(Steespecially difficult problem is that 1t1X2 may underestimate the uumbar of users who upgrade their
systcmma (Duihcrger, private communication).
°Thehistory of each new- systens was exsnaned. Did the developmeni of its installed base follow a
reasonable panem of growth, i.e., several years of growth followed by several years of decline? The absence of
such s psncns questions the platambilimy of the data.
27tuaddition, using these prices is not sdthoot precedent in the hedonic literature. The prices for new
sysmerso used by Gordon (as-well as many others) are very similar to those used here. Gordon's prices for his
sample arier 197? were taieen from fiotnpuls ma nt ,whichis published by .22
conclusions should rely exclusively on one price.
Vy3frych.aractenrte
The characteristics that make up x partially overlap those used in Gordon's [1989],
[1999]., Dedborgefs [1989], and Olineds [1992] analysis of computer system hedonic
regressions (see Triplets for a complete summary of the relevant issues). MIPS,ormillions of
instructions per second, is an estimate of speed. The maximum memory included in a system
is an estimate of memory size.25
MIPS and memory size data use not available for every systero in evesy year.
Computer intelligence Coenon-stion (dC) provides information about the features of systems
extant in 1991 and other imnortant l'dstorical systems?9 CIC's characteristic data covers
roughly three quarters of the most important mabd±aeae and supetominicomputer systems
(mod primarily in business applications) in 1981, or more than 90 percent of the installed
base, 'izrdch makes it more coroprehensive than any other single data source. Table 1 shows
that mild characteristic data matches an increasing fraction of the total number of models IDC
surveyed. The sample size begins at 59 for 1968 and grows to 178 by 1981.
tDC provides a meesure of the techrdcal generation of a system. Dulbergcr [1989]
°Becausen'.intmam and maximum memory are highly correlated (between .6 arid .7 in a year), only one
could be used. Because there are nesny reasons ta think that mascimsun memory is more reievsot to buyers than
minimum (Brmnalsan end Greemtein [1992]), nsasdman memory is used throughout the estimation.
°Themacnorm of these veriablee come from Computer tntelligenre Comomtions (CtC) 1991 Computer
System Reoort, 'sitiob has many virtues relative to aitematives, the Computerworid dais, whirls Professor
Gordon has kindly lent out, begins in 1977. Is covers too few systems up to 1981 to be useful. The Auethsoh
data, winch Profesmr tvtiohaeis isas lets out, covers the early part of else 1970s. Unfortunately, it also only oovom
a small number of yen's. While the Phismer (1979) data covers a longer period, it generally only records the
system charsreertstics for the most popular systems and not the whole mari.et. In fart, Phisterir data covers only
shoes 20 percent so 55) cisrment of the system models surveyed by Be. ClOts data covers the same systenvs, pim
many more.23
arctics that hedonic techniques may be mismeasuring the factors deciding prices when the
data is taken from a cross-section of systems in a market undergoing rapid technological leap
froggine' by successive new systems. Duiberger argues that this "disequilibrium' requires an
explicit treatment in a hedonic framework. The simplest means for testing Duibergeis
arcumnent. as found in Bemdt and (llriliches [1990] and Oliner [1992], is a measure of the
time that has elapsed since introduction. This variable is labeled "techage" Systems that had
more experience in the marketplace should have more software and other complementary
system enhancements, ediich increase the system's quality for the user.
IDC's censuses categorize every system by size, with size ranging from 2 to 7. This
measure is of limited usefulness for a regressor because it is categorical, not continuous, and
is hi able correlated with MIPS and memory. however, it will be useful for the simulations,
because it is available fbr all systems, and therefore it provides a means for testing important
differences betv,cen entry behavior on the highest and lowest end of the computing-power
spectrum.
lr'struments (the zmatrix)Ibm each system are all of the characteristic data from the
nearest lower and higher neighboring system (fur which there is characteristic data). These
characteristics are typically exogenous, since they are designed by another finn. Yet they are
also correlated with the characteristics of the neighboring system, so they make for good
hatrunients°
'fable 2 shows how the typical system in the sample changes over time. The average
price of a system (deflated by a producer price index) and the average size of a system's
°Thaks to SteveBonyand Frank Wolak forthissuggestion.24
mstailattons included in the sample decline over most of the years of the sample. The typical
system contains more memory (from 1099 to 5592 maximum memory on avenge) and
pontoons more instntctioaspersecond (from .326 to 2.22). These statistics about MIPS and
memory suggest that the product spece was extended over the sample period, hut they are
msuracent for conclusions about the economic importance of the extension. The most
dramatic changes in the avenge occur in the last three years of the sample upon the eatry of
some large supercomputers. Despite the addition of aew systems to the sample, the everage
technical age grows (from 4.1 to 8.9); the inclusion of some very old systems in the sample
of later years is to blame for this incse.ase in toe average,
[Table 2 approximately here]
Figure 2 provides an illustration of the diflltsion of large systems and foreshadows
results from the estimation. Figure 2 shows a box-plot of the distribution of MIPS in the
computer systems used in each year.5 The dark areas provide the range between the first and
third quartile, while the wbdte line shows the median. Every line above it represents a
particular system until the maximum. While this is a coarse measure of computing capacity,
the figaro shows a gradual extension of the product space. It also shows a gradual buyer
adoption of those extensions, and gradual shifting of revenues to systems with bdgher
computing capacity. For example, the MIPS of the 95th percentile of 1968 is the median of
the MIPS of systems in use by 1981. in addition, the product space between the maximum
and the 95th percentile becomes progressively filled in over tinse with new products, even as
The tigure onty shows the MIPS ratings for the syetems that vera used to the estimation, Woile this is an
incomptete sesopie of the systems in use, the coverage unds to be almost complete for the tsrgest systems sod
the most popular systems. Hence, this provides a pretty accurate reflection of changes for the targer systems.25
these points vaiy. Yet manyyearsmust pass hefore the extensionsof productspaceare
widely adopted. The 95th percentile stays roughly the same between 1968to1973 and
between 1974 and 1976,andonlybeginsto grow after 1977.
[Figure 2 approximately here]
'1ff Resrilts
This section presents estimates of the model and various tests of those estimates. The
discussion also presents calculations of buyer surplus and the rate of decline in the cost
Sanction. These estimates and calculations quantil3' the dramatic changes in the computer
indusuy that took place oser this period.
adfltt3
'l'abie 3 presents estinutes of the conjectural variations model. With a few exceptions,
most of the estimates of (1andf3areof the predicted sign and are significant. Systems with
more eompuung power possess higher quality and have higher marginal cost. More memory
contributes to the perceived quality of a product and to its increasing cost in all but the 1968
sample. Faster systents have higher quality and higher marginal costs in all of the estimates
except the 1972, 1973, and 1980 samples, when the coefficients are not significant. Older
systems usually possess higher quality and have higher marginal cost, but the coefficient is
insignificant half the time on the supply side, Fstimates for the size of the potential market
are small, estimated at 1 percent. For unapparent reasons, the model appears to fit badly in
1968, 1974, and 1989.
[Table 3 approximately here]La
The acriabirs measuring acmputing power are often quantitatively important on both
tie demand and the supplyrides.These results arc consistent with the basic assumption of
this model, that comçutiogoowernone expiams most 0'thecross-rectio'a variationin
demand for comouting. Foe varyingsizeof the technical ape variable does not support the
view that disc uilibduo pricing matters much for the model and data. which is also
'cnsisen. veith the methodological approach of this paper.
A cunosty of :oe'e first estimates is that crrefficieats on the supply side do not seem
to show a large radaction in the costs of supplying characteristics over time At most, there
a smo'l (and erratic downward shIft in the costs of characteristics This seems at odds with
eeli-kocwo decilnec ir the costs of rreioory and processors, Later estimates showed that this
:ottem was an artifact of too much econometric freedom. A more constrained cost-frmction
scxaoitkatioo, more typical of the literature, will measure some anticipated decline below.
One other feature of these estimates has to do with the model's econometrics. The
cstinaate of the implied quality of a system in one year has almost no econometric relationship
to that eatiniate in another year. The model in each year requires that systems "price
discriminrte" between users with different viilingncss to pay for computing power. but it
does not rerlaire similar quality' estimates for a given system from year to year. Thus, nothing
inherently ties doom the estimates of the implied quality of a system from year to year and
the estimates of scrptus generated from those estimates of implied quality. Olven this
econometric freedom, it is remarkable that the coefficient estimates do tend to have the same
sOn and roughly some order' f ioagoitude from year to year and roughly make sense. At thc
same time, the demand paranacteos are not ciose to constant across all years, These changcs27
support the view that there are frequent changes to the basic relationship between the
underlying valuation of computing capacity and the measurable features of computing
capacity.
VIL2. Testing the necdtd
The null hypothesis is that the conjecture parameter is zero, 'which is rejected. The
vaiae nf the conjectural parameter rejects Bertrand pricing. The benefit to undercutting rivals
is small, ic.. price increases are closely matched. All specifications and experiments 'with this
data, many not sho'rn here, could not eliminate this result,
There are t'wo fundamental reasons for this estimate. First, many products are priced
close togethcr, especially at the low end where many older systems arc found.32 The model
must mteTret these systems ac lose substitutes, especially when each system has such low
market share. While this is probably the right inference for most systems with small market
share, it underemphasizes the importance of systems that have significantly higher market
shares, Second, there is not enough flexibility in the marginal revenue equation to adapt to the
'wide dispersion of market shares in this data. The only free parameter is M, but M is
constrained to be irteater than the number of systems sold. While the model does attribute
less competitive elasticities to the high-market share systems, it may scale all the elasticity
estimates incorrectly. M would have to become much smaller to generate elasticity estimates
that are sensihie her the high-market share systems. The conjectural variations parameter
provides more flexibility because it rcscales the elasticities, while retaining more inelastic
elasticities for systems 'with higher market share. Systems with large market shares display
32Thedifference between neighboring systems aserages araund 3 percent of the price of the lower prired
system, but grows for the iiigber priced systems.28
elasticities consistent withlargedifferences betweenmarginal cost and price, and high
markups over marcinal cost?3
This result suggests one of two thingy: First, if the model cnrrectiy models product
differentiation, then the firms behave quite differently fiom Bertrand pricing (i.e., they are
niuch less aggressive). Second, using a hypothesis that is more plausible the parameter may
show that some factors outside the modeli.e., factors other than the pricing and product
differentiation modeled here —largelydecide competition between vendors, This is plausible
if vendors arc competing by embodying unmeasured new features in each generation of their
products. This possibility mises the same thndsmentai issues with which this paper becan
i.e., nbout the proper meara for modeling product differentiation and behavior in this industy,
Table 4 sununsarizes the simulation of the consumer surplus for each year for the
coricctnasl variations model. The estimates of net total surplus are large. rougbdy one to two
rolion dollars a month (these are net of the potential benefits of purchasing the outside
t'ood)?° However, the estimates are also enatic, moving around by more than 50 percent
fromonecried to the next. The average surplus per system, switch controls for the changes
in the number of systems in use in a year, makes more sense, These estimates also fluctuate.
a Only a subset ot the total number of systems svailsbls display high markups over cost, salsicis seems
plausible. tn.soeotion of the data revealsthatthese systems are almost always the systems with large market
snares sod they almost always come from HiM. T'oere is also a slight tendency far more expensive systems to
have larger (absolute value) markups, bet smaller markups as a oercentsge of price. Thts is because these
systems are not as closely priced (in absolute value terms) to theft neighbors as the by/er priced systems sod
also have lower market shares.
StrIctly speaktng, this restriction makes these estimates of surplus incomparable both previous surplus
estimates in this market (e.g., Bresnalsen [1987], Fianscn [1989], Brynolfason [1993]).29
but less than those that estimate the amount of total surplus. These estimates show an
irregular but steady decline in the consumer surplus per system alter 1971. Table 4 also
shows the net total surplus per net dollar expenditure (net ut potential expenditure on the
outside good). This too shows a slow hut steady decline oIler 1971.
[Table 4 approximately here)
There arc several oossibleexplanauons for the decline in net surplusper system and
surplus per dollur, FLrst, the model may increasiny fall to properly expi buyer exit from
the mainframe market La the lute 1979s. The availability of super-minicomputers, which
shams up as a devalued otainframa computer in this model, could lie behind the trend. This
notion is possible, hut only partially successful, The rise in the net expenditure after 1977 is
due to a large discreet change tothenommal price of the outside good (from 3675 to 28th))
and utflation in the late l970s, which pnxluces the decline in the surplus per expenditure after
1977. Yet no such simple explanution can account for trends between 1971 and 1976. The
decline in net surplus per system is the result of the increase in the number ofsystems but not
the increase in net su.rplus. The lack of increase in net surplus is still themystery.
A second possibility, the most plausible one, is that the reduction of product
thtferentiation to one dimension oversimplifies substitution possibilities. The model
implausibly shows a crowded product space as new systems enter, as if all new entty occurs
ott intensive martins. In practice, many new systems may enter on extensive margins that this
model cannot measure, ibis ne'.v entry generates gains in true, yet unmeasureth consumer
surplus. Therefore, the estimate in Table 4 is too low, particularly in later yes.us as systems
get many new capabilities. This explanation suggests that, at best, these estimates can only do30
a good job of estimating surplus generated at the extensive margin (more computing
capacity).
MlLThThe importance of entry on ext61LLthnJa;s
Table S displays estimates of entry 00 the ordy extensive margin in this model, more
compoting capacity. The table shows the amount of surplus attributable to systems in tDC's
size 5, 6. arid 7 categories, the top three categories in its ordinal ranking of system size. The
percentage of surplus artiObumble to systems beth high capacities grows over time. Roudy
21 percent pfto surplus in 1968 is attributable to systems of size 5, 6, and 7, and only 8
percent to systems of size 6 and 7. Thds grows to as much as 54 percent for all, and 23and
14 for size 6 and 7. respectively, in 1981. Much of the growth in size 6 comes before 1976.
oddie growth occurs almost every year for size 7 systems. This reflects a general trend and is
not an artifact of any arbitrary data defmition of size by IDC.55
[Table S approximately here]
The table hiel-dights two ether factors about growth on the extensive margin. First., the
fraction of the installed base of systems attributable to the high-capacity systems is small,
never amounting to more than 10 percent of the total number of systems in 1968 and 25
percent in 1981. Yet this small fraction of systems accounts for a disproportionate amountof
consumer surplus --21percent in 1968 and 54 in 1981. Part of this occurs because larger
systems cast more to the customer. Even though there are fewer of them,the expenditure per
system is great. Extending the product space a bit results in a huge increase of expenditore,
'Forexample, tExt's censuses show a perceptible decline in the entry ef size 2 systems after 1976
(Greenstein [l993l-. Yet this bias does not explain the time trend in table 6 because most size 2syste,nswore
net included in this sample as a result of adopting a consistent definition for the outside good.31
though not nearly as many new units, This estimate supports the argument that arowth on the
extensive margin may have large influences on buyer surplus.
However, the same estfres quantd3' anew aspect to extensive margin growth. Note
how long it took for this market to register much growth on the extensive margin. Surplus in
size 7 undergoes steady, but slow growth. Surplus in size 6 grows rapidly in the first half of
the sample and slowly, but unevenly, from there on out. A close examination of the data
illustrates why. The most popular size 6 system, IBM 360/65, was first installed in late 1965,
By 1968 users installed over three hundred 360/65 models and over five hundred other more
expensive systems. The IBM 37/155 then supplants the 360/65 as the most popular system of
size 6 in the early 1970s, hut the dision takes seseral years to reaeh its peak. By the late
1970s, however, no single system dominates the large system size earegory any longer. There
is ordy gradual change on the extensmve mnargin in the mid to late 1970s as new systems only
slowly become widely used. The slow but steady entry of many different new systems
accounts for most of the growth in the late l970s,
Table 5 also presents estmmstes of the percentage of sumlus in each year atthbutthle to
systems of different vintages, principally those less than or equal to 4 and 6 years old. This
partially addresses the coneem that new products not only are cheaper, but embody new
unmeasured features not reflected in the price. First, as expected, young vintages tend to
generate the most sumpias, averaging 22 to 47 percent of surplus, depending on the measure.
Tins result, combined with die inability of teehage to predict system demand, suggests that
buyers purchase systems for more than just capacity, but this quality is not measurable in a
simple manner. Second, the mmnpomtunee of young vintages differs dramatically from year to32
year. A few specific vintages influence surplus estimates. The technical vintage introduced in
1965-66 demiaates the surplus caiculatinns until the mid 1970s, wisich unquestionably reflects
the popularity nf the tBM system 360. The next major wave of surplus is associated with the
IBM system 370 (mostly vintage =1971and 1973). Tnese tea vintage effects dn nnt wurie
themselves nut until virtually the end of the sample, when the entry of many flew systems
bet'ins to influence the surplus simulations,
No other family of systems genemtes so much surplus as the system 360 and 370
because no other family of systems has such a large market share. While this qualitative
result is not surprising (see Greenstein [1994]), it raises important issues. First, it suggests
that estimates of the benefits from technical change in the early years of computing arc
determined by estimates of the benefits associated with the technical improvements in a few
of the dominant systems of that era. Only in the later years are the benefits spread acrcss
more models. Second, it highlights the importance of properly measuring the benefits
associated with the system 360/370. In any quantity-weighted measurement exercise, such as
the above, small changes in estimates of the benefits associated with the system 360 and 370
lead to large changes in estimates of the benefits to society from technical changes in
computing. Tins observation adds importance to the debate about the (measured) economic
benefits associated with the system 370 (e.g., sea Dulberger [1989], Gordon [1989], and
Triplett [1989]) and whether most of the benefits from technical Change accrued to buyers.
Finally, these results again misc the unresolved question about the proper method for
weighting a popular system relative to less commercially successful systems in a hedonic
regression.-'-5
Table 6 puts the pattern of enLry into final perspective. It computes the counterldctuaj
surplus generated if all new systems were absent (those less than 4 and 6 years old). It
displays this counterfactual surplus as a fraction of buyer surplus measured with all the
systems. This is ía the spirit of welfare calculations that keep the demand characteristics
fixed, but alter the choices available to buyers. Removing young systems simulates -demand in
the absence of any technical change Not sthsingiy, surplus declines without new systems.
However, in any given rear it does not decline by more than a few percentage points. The
largest declines are associated with the counterfactual elimination of the system 360 in the
early years of the sample. In the mid I 970s the decline is less than 1 percent and less than 3
percent by the late I biOs, especially for young systems,
T'able 6 approximately here]
Table 6 displays a well-known characteristic of countc'rfbctual welfare measures of
technical change: a new technology is only as good as the alternatives to it are bad. Even if
no new systems were invented, buyers would continue to use old technology. In this model,
old systems are very close substitutes, and switching between substitutes is assumed to be
costless, The product space is 'crowded as a result, so that the absence of a new teehnology'
sends buyers to a worse, but lower priced, system. Since entiy on the intensive margins can
only generate large gains when the product space is not crowded, the bigg rphn to such
entry m this model are recorded early in the sample, when the indusL is still yOung. Since
this crowding is probably an artiflict of not measuring all the dimensions that buyers value,
tt seems less plausible to estimate the counterfactual surplus in the absence uf a system eta particular
size, In that munterfactaal world, there would be a large supplier meapanae in shortnin pricing behavior and
lungrun desien behavior, Simulating that counerfactual behavior does not make any paint that cannot already be
matte with the resulu in table 7.34
and Table 5 shows that a substantial number of buyers continue to purchase young systems,
Tablo 6 representsa(potentially severe) underestimate of the true sueplus losses.
Table 6 echoes the observation that innovation takes a long tinac to achieve its full
effect (only here it is about the entry of new systems). Though the net beneflt from new
systems is small in any given year, the cumulative effect over many years is quite large. That
is, if all technical change had ceased in l968, by 198i the cumulative losses in each year
would have been enormous. However, not to belabor the point, but the longrun estimate of
loss is surely an underestimate. Much evidence suggests that important product characteristics
are not being measured here, 'Fne amount of mismeasurement must increase as the time
periods in comparison become further apart.
Tables 5and6 embody both the strengths and weaknesses of the approach taken in
this paper. On the one hand, standard hedonic methods could not lead to these tnhlns or the
conclusions reached from them. Table 6 quantifies the benefits from new technology in usc,
while hedonic price methods stop at estimating improvements in what is available. Though
this papeds conclusions require structural assumptions about the nature of demand, this is par
(hr the course in using data on both quantities and prices. My other Structural model that
incorporates more dimensions boll necessarily show the same effects highlighted in this paper
and possibly more. On the dovoiside, Tables 5and6 are only as good as the structural
assumptions that generated them. Parts of this paper (and other analyses of this market,
Bresnahan and Greonstcin l992]) suggest that product differentiation is incomplately
modeled here and potentially correlated with age. Entry probably also occurred on nore
extensive margins than are modeled. If that is so, Tables 5 and 6 provide a lower bound on35
the welfare losses from the absence of innovation.
ttiondlie
Table 7 estimates cost f(mcttone on exactly the same data as vms used in Table 3. the
two equations use something aba to standard hedonic specitications but supplement it with a
market oower correction, as fouad in a vertical mode! both conjectural variations. Eppation
two takes fre form ln(P3 ={FQ]/[PbvIg(P,Q,MJrcct gg The second equation is similar,
but specifies a different F over tiroe. The market size, M, is assumed to be about 1 percent
larger thaa the observed market, taken from the previous conjectural variation estimates in
Table 3,37 All the data is pooled such that ahasonecoefficient for MIPS, memory, and age,
but diflbrent year durraay coeliicicnts, viftich captures the change in the level of the cost
Fraction of firms.38 This specification assumes thar all firms draw from the sanic cost Fraction
in a given year. Rather than exphcitiy model the demand side, which has !itt!e interest here,
the estimates err ploy a reduced tbrm for demand. Demand is a fanction of the same set of
regressors and instruments as used previously, plus time dummies. This treats MIPS, memory.
age, and market power as endogenous and the time dummies as exogenous.
[Table 7 approximately here]
The cost Fraction estimates have the following three features: First, coefficients for
memory, MIPS, and age all have the correct stgn. Second, none of the estimates show a
The above resets suggest that lois ts last by esttmatisg a e.anjectunti variations incatel as if M it known
(even 'Then it is not). In any event, in a eoo'setorsi vanstions nsodel, the coniectorsi parameter 'would scale any
estin'.nte, effectively acting in the opposite direcuon of any 'set.tni.ate of the roadset size. Hence, it is much easier,
and no less insisbffol, to simply aseonvn a given size of a market, compote the implied pnxloct elasticities, and
then estimate a coniect'nre parameter to sonic the elasticity estaontoa properly.
°Thoogn the dammy coefficients an.' anbiaaed estimates, the mdcx will not be. It is a nonlinear function of
an mbiaaed estimate. To correct ibr thin bias, the estimated standard errora use an appmximation suggested by
Thpieu [t989. This involves adding ,,ne bait of the standard error to die coefficient before compoang the index.36
monotonically declining rate of technical change. The most problematic of all the estimates
are 1968 throua 1970, whichmaybe due to changes in IDUs sampling frame in those years.
This problem does not seem to be a manifestation of the movement from. the iBM 360 to the
tBM 370, vthicb was first introduced in 1971. Third, all the estimates measure rapid rates of
technical change over the long am. Equation I, which estimates only one conjecture
parameter for the entire sample, fmds a decline in the cost function of 20.0 percent over 14
years and 30.3 percent from 1971 to 1981. The second equation, bedch estimates a different
conjecture parameter for each of the three IDC sampling periods, estimates declines of 11.7
percent over 14 years and 25.5 percent from 1971 to 198l, The diffenmc.es in the. estimates
suggest that thnctionai form influences the precise estimate of change in markei pcover and
the change in the cost frmnction. In both cases, decreases in the prices to consumcrs were due
partly to changes in market power and partly to declines in the cost function.0
yjjj.çjgg
This paper measures the economic benefits that accrued to buyers from technical
innovation in mainframe computers. The thesis is that many innovations that created
economic value in this period are associated with extensions in computing capabilities.
Answers to the questions raised in the introduction provide a suitable summary of this
Interacting s time trend with the conjecture parameter did not result in qualitatively different conclusions.
Equation two is presented because it is easier to interpret and read.
Finally, it is not correct to infer that market power increased over time just because the C itteroacoed.
Instead, one must examine changes in the distribution of product specific elasticities. Close examination of those
elasticities, not abeam here, reveals a more competitive market over time —inthe aerate that toe ntaduut product
specific elasticity is more elastic, as are every other order statistic of the elasticity. This is not surprisina in this
model since the product space becomea increasingly crowded over time.'1
analysis.
What valuable mnovatoos m this period are associated voth extensions of capabtlities?
It was argued that technical change in the computing .rnaiker involved much more than rapid
declines in the price of existing capabilities. While pnce declines enabled many of the events
that took place, important episodes of value creation were associated with specific inventions
that extended buyer capabilities into new areas --e.g.,the invention of reliable real-time
database query, the invention of multi-user computing without interruption. Value creation
was not assoctated soleiy with the decline in costs of the -delivery of these services.
Do buyers adopt products that embody extensions of capabilities? The economic
history and the econometric results show that adoption decisions were not solely the result of
buyers taldng advantage of lower prices thr existing capabilities. The data and estimates show
that many buyers purchased larger computing capachy embodied in products that caine into
existence in the l970s.
How does a measurement framework represent that action? 'Bbs shady argued that
some fraction of the new capabilities associated with new systems is not measurable, but is
complementary with increases in computing capacity. Therefore, a model of the supply and
demand for products with difibrent computing capacity will capture some demand for new
capabilities. Such a model has several interesting features: I. Buyers slowly adopt higher
capacity systems, suggesting that greater attention needs to be paid to the diffusion of new
technolocy in this market (Cireenstcin [i994j); 2. Decreases in prices to consumers were due
partly to changes in market power and partly to declines in cost. All th-e estimates measure
rapid rates of decline in the costs of providing computer capacity over the long ran.38
Are most extensions ordy embodied in capaeity or other features of the products?
Competition in computing is partially represented by extensions in computing capacity and
partially by the technological age of systems, but not entirely. The cionjectorai variation
estimates and the demand parameter estimates suggest there was not a stable relationship over
time between measurable features of products and revealed buyer choice. This is not
surprising because of the well-icnov,n changing value of outside goods. It is also not
surprising because of the likely changing valuation of computing capacity that resulted from
innovation of complementary components. Therefore, constant çoality indices of price decline
potentially oath the factors that influence changes to economic welfare for many buycrs.
in sum, much significant innovation in this industry was associated with cascading
capabilities to new levels. This is not an argument that price decreases were unimportant to
buyers, only that price decreases do not tell nearly the bosole story about the welfarc
improvements realized by buyers --perhapsthey even tell a deceptive story, Thcrc arc many
implications from this conclusion for understanding competition and value creation in this
industry (e.g., see Bresnahan and Greenstein [t992]). This study focuses on whether constant
quality price indices provide good information about welfare benefits from technological
change. It will for the buyers 'hno continue to buy products with similar sets of
characteristics, but not necessarily for the buyers wio take advantage of the availability of
characteristics that did not previously exist. Many buyers fall into this latter camp. It is time
that these observations about extension of capabilities became a central part of the discussion
about the creation of economic benefits from technological change in computing.39
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1.0000 3600.0000 166Ta1e 2 (contirned)
Sa1e Statietica
Technical Age
Yeci Sean 0ev VarianceLzrcmdcranSamnle Size
91440303i94 37503 0,334n 88340 53
1969 4.6989 2.1959 4.8252 1.0000 98340 60
1970 5.1931 2.5382 5.4426 0 9170 10.8340 54
1971 5.4792 2.9629 8,7755 0.2500 11.8340 6'j '924 03840 7'
1973 5.9156 3.4092 11.63.61 0.4170 13.8340 88
1974 6,5785 3.7091 03.7573 1.1670 14.8340 96
1975 7.2281 3.8218 14.6060 1.1670 15.8340 101











1977 5. 5930 I5.0557 25.6615 1.0840 20.0000 138
1990 9.911)90 5.4092 29.2483 1.0840 21.0000 155









































































































Na: Suroloaf Net totalI Net Surplus
Per Nroeodatuie! tootalledPer $ Net




1953 9.1791 649.53 25541 2.75 1793.34
1953 9.9742 733.59 27333 2.59 2033,79
1970 0.0694 392.01 29283 2.28 2033.82
1371 0.1153 859.85 24603 3.29 2.837..05
1972 0.0933 923.13 26920 2.73 2525.84
1573 0.0553 839.75 27301 1.59 1511.44
1574 0.0334 864.14 27747 1.07 929.47
1975 0.0346 830.13 29510 1.16 1022.11
1973 0.0287 866.50 31583 1.04 909.08
1977 0.0417 1070.33 33201 1.29 1385.83
1978 0.0344 1163.21 36209 1.20 1407.28













a..utloa reesoros toe .sorrlua paoerstso oat of the roteide goad.
Net exoeodirore leasT .72. represents toe exre.oditure so systems in.
the aerrle (IP.Qj tess the eaneoditore on the outsrde goad (tP0Q. -Table 5
Pezzentage Surplus Associated with Different Vintages and Sizes
Year Teabage ￿4usars
Tachage ￿Susarsedius
Size =5Size =6 Size



























































































































































A: Surplus associaced with types of systems as percentage of total
surplus.























Year 1975.8816 3.8561 14.8696 1966 1981
Men 24305 5.4442 29.6394 0,0080 .65,8360
MJ.ps 0.6553 3.5653 12,7110 0.1000 99.0000






-0.12966814 284'09 -0. i4210Table 7 contiaued)
Coat 3\octioo Eatimatesi
Validcases 1437 eodeo:rrao1e 3xo of rorce
0.213 Rbar-soo,ared: 0.209


































































**T..cel.ae exceeds 2.55Table 7(continued)
Coat Function Eatinatee
Valid cases: 1435 Copendent variable: Lcg 5 price
R-scuxred: 0.193 Rbar-sc'uared: 0.182
Reedus1 SE: 6357.5 SOd error ofset: 2.120
Variable Estirrate
Standard
Error
Real Coat
Index
rem
mipsae
F,58-59
r, 70-75
F, 77-81
dEe
dES
d70
d71
d72
d73
d74
d75
d76
d77
Id78
d79
d80
d81
0.234
0.127
0.055
-132.7
-983.5
-1470.3
3.479
-3.511
-2.886
-2.668
-2.535
-3.000
-3.141
-3,598
-3.897
-3.470
-4.023
-4.313
-4.751
-5,419
O.0707**
0.105
0.120
252.3
204,5*5
5Q35*
C.52
0.55
0,67
0.88
0.67
0,69
977**
0.815*
0.80
599*5
0.96*5
l,04**
1.02*5
1.12
100.0
98,8
261.9
243,7
249,4
174.9
158.1
102.1
757
127.0
72.3
56.3
36.0
13.4
*T_.lue exceeds1.96
**Tenlueexceeds2.56